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COMMENTS
"PUBLIC INTEREST" STANDING FOR THE FEDERAL TAXPAYER:
A PROPOSAL
I. INTRODUCTION
During the depression years of the 1930's Congress established a number
of new Federal administrative agencies and provided that persons "aggrieved"
by the actions of these agencies could obtain judicial review.' The courts
have commonly construed an "aggrieved party" to be one who has been person-
ally injured by administrative action.2 Recently, however, the aggrieved party
concept has been substantially broadened. Parties who have not suffered per-
sonal damage have been granted standing to represent the "public interest."3
Public interest standing has been of limited use under the common law. The
state and municipal taxpayer, suing on behalf of the citizenry at large, normally
can test the validity of state and local government expenditures. 4 However, the
federal taxpayer has no right to question Congressional spending. 5
The purpose of this comment is to determine the applicability of public
interest standing to the federal taxpayer. Pursuant to this purpose, public inter-
est standing in relation to federal administrative agencies will first be examined.
A discussion of state and local taxpayer suits is also included and will be
followed by an examination of taxpayer standing at the federal level. Finally,
the policies involved in public interest standing will be analyzed with a recom-
mendation as to future treatment.
II. "PUBLIC INTEREST" STANDING AND THE FEDERAL AGENcIES
Statutes which created agencies before the Depression years did not pro-
vide for "aggrieved party" standing. Instead, the courts required that a pro-
testing party have suffered a "legal wrong" from agency action before he
could initiate judicial proceedings. This meant that a person had standing
if an agency order violated one of his common law rights6 or a right conferred
by statute.7 In addition, standing might be granted to an appellant asserting
personal harm to an interest which Congress intended the regulatory agency to
1. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act § 9(a), 48 Stat. 80 (1933), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) (1964); Federal Power Act § 313(b), 49 Stat. 860 (1935), as amended,
16 U.S.C. § 825-1(b) (1964); Natural Gas Act, § 19(b), 52 Stat. 831 (1938), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1964).
2. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
3. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
4. See Crampton v. ZabriLkie, 101 U.S. 601, 609 (1879).
5. Frothingbam v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1922).
6. See, e.g., F.H. Peavey Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 176 F. 409, 416-18 (C.C.N.). Mo.
1910), modified sub nom. ICC v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42 (1911). In Peavey, a railroad
was granted standing because of a violation of its right of freedom of contract. The ICC
order which was challenged forbade railroad rebates to owners of grain elevators. See also
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1939).
7. See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1938); Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1937); American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
187 U.S. 94 (1902).
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protect, even though that interest did not constitute a "legal right" of the
appellant. 8 Since the power granted to the agency by Congress extended only to
the industry over which the particular agency had control, non-members of
that industry had no interest which the agency had to protect and therefore bad
no basis for standing.9 Furthermore, absent an invasion of a legal right or a
protected interest, no one had standing on the basis of financial injury suffered
from agency action.
A substantial change in the concept of standing occurred when Congress
passed the "aggrieved party" statutes.' 0 In the 1940 case of FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station" the Supreme Court held that petitioner's status as a
competitor of a newly-licensed radio station rendered it a party "aggrieved"
by the agency's licensing of the new station. Thus, the complaining litigant
could appeal despite the fact that he could not qualify for standing under the
previously developed rules. He had not suffered a violation of a "legal right,"
for no station possessed the right to remain free from competition.' 2 Nor was the
petitioner's competitive position an interest which Congress intended the
agency to protect; the commission was not required to consider economic injury
to competitors in deciding whether new licenses should be issued.' 3 The Court
justified its grant of standing by relying on the Congressional purpose in pro-
viding for judicial review of administrative action, noting that the legislature
allowed court review in order to confine administrative agencies to their dele-
gated powers. Since ultra vires administrative action often does not result in
abridgment of "legal rights," Congressional intent would be frustrated by
confining the right to appeal to those "legally" injured. Therefore, the Court
assumed' 4 that the legislature had intended to confer standing upon persons
suffering economic injury, as a means of checking administrative power and
insuring consideration of the public interest in agency decisions.'5
The Sanders doctrine caused a shift in judicial focus. Previously, attention
had been given only to the private rights of litigants protesting agency action.
Now, however, if no private right had been infringed, the petitioner could at-
tempt to convince the court that a public right was impaired because the ques-
tioned administrative action was not in the "public interest." As a prerequisite
to presenting this argument, the litigant was merely required to show that he
was economically damaged by the challenged agency decision. Thus, those who
8. See, e.g., The Chicago junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 266-69 (1924).
9. See, e.g., L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 295 (1940).
10. Included within the concept of "aggrieved party" is a party "adversely affected."
See, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 701(f) 52 Stat. 1055 (1938) ; as amended, 21 U.S.C.
371(f) (1964), interpreted in Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
11. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
12. Id. at 475.
13. Id, at 473-76.
14. There was no legislative history to guide the Court in interpreting the meaning of
"persons aggrieved" in the Federal Communications Act § 402(b) (6), 48 Stat. 926 (1934),
47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1964).
15. 309 U.S. at 477.
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were personally injured by administrative action became "representatives of
the public interest."'16
The Sanders Court did not provide a broad availability of appeal; the
class of persons permitted to initiate judicial review was initially limited by
the facts of the Sanders case. Sanders involved personal material injury from
direct competition. Presumably, the incentive derived from substantial and
direct loss was thought necessary to assure energetic representation of the
public interest. Thus, in subsequent cases involving station licensing by the
Federal Communications Commission, standing was granted only to competing
stations who alleged electrical interference 17 or substantial economic loss.18
The above restrictions severely limited the use of judicial review since
administrative action often did not significantly and directly affect a competi-
tor.10 However, a gradual liberalization of the Sanders doctrine eventually
brought such action within the purview of the judiciary.20 In this process,
judges have broadened the class of persons who may challenge administrative
rulings by recognizing minimal personal injury as a basis for standing. Thus, by
accepting the barest demonstration that competition may cause financial loss,
the courts have allowed parties in one field of a regulated industry to protest
administrative action in another field. In the broad area of communications,
radio stations21 and newspapers2 2 have been termed "aggrieved" by television
license grants. Furthermore, an electronics firm, engaged in neither broadcasting
nor publishing, has been allowed to protest the license renewal of a local tele-
vision station controlled by a rival manufacturer.
28
The courts have also recognized that competitors in an industry outside the
scope of the agency's power may nevertheless be affected by an administrative
ruling. Two noteworthy cases exemplify a judicial acceptance of indirect com-
petitive loss as a basis for standing. In National Coal Ass'n v. FPC,24 an associa-
tion of coal mine owners was permitted to appeal from a Federal Power Com-
mission order authorizing construction of a gas pipeline. The court found that
16. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942).
17. FCC v. NBC (KOA), 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
18. See, e.g., Metropolitan Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir.
1955); National Anti-Vivisection Soc. v. FCC, 234 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ill. 1964). The FCC
has taken the same view of Sanders in its decisions on standing before the Commission.
See, e.g., Northco Microwave, Inc., 5 P&F Radio Reg. 912 (FCC 1963).
19. Remote economic injury has been a common ground for denial of standing. See,
e.g., Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 219 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 945 (1955); United States Cane Sugar Refiner's Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F.2d 116 (2d
Cir. 1943).
20. See Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.); vacated as moot,
320 U.S. 707 (1943); National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Philco
Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959).
21. See, e.g., Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 285 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Versluis Radio & Television, Inc., 9 P&F Radio Reg. 102 (FCC 1953).
22. See Clarksburg Publ. Co. v. FCC 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
23. Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946
(1959).
24. 191 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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the economic injury which might be sustained by the petitioners was sufficient
to provide a basis for standing.25 Similarly, in City of Pittsburgh v. FPC,20
petroleum carriers were allowed to protest the abandonment of a natural gas
pipeline because the pipeline owners might utilize it to transport petroleum in
the future. This possibility of financial loss through an indirect competitor's
action provided the appellant with grounds for standing.
27
Judicial recognition of non-competitive loss has provided a basis for
further extending standing to the consumer class.28 The position of the con-
sumer, who may suffer loss because of agency price-fixing, has been equated
to that of the radio station in Sanders; the threat of financial loss qualified
both parties to represent the public interest in agency decisions.20 However,
unlike the radio station, the possible economic loss to the consumer may be
minimal"° and need not be a direct consequence of the administrative action. 1
The courts have apparently recognized that administrative action which
affects the public interest may not cause direct personal damage. Accordingly,
the personal injury requirement of the Sanders case has been lessened to ensure
representation of the public interest in more agency decisions. Since parties other
than direct competitors have been able to meet this lesser requirement, the
class of petitioners who may obtain public interest standing has been broadened.
Nevertheless, some writers have called for the complete abandonment of the
personal injury restriction, reasoning that, since the only ground for allowing
these suits was the potential injury to the public, the necessity of personal
injury served no purpose.3 2 These writers have commonly cited United States
ex rel. Chapman v. FPC33 with approval. In Chapman the Supreme Court,
although unable to agree on the reasons for its decision,34 granted the Secretary
of Interior standing to contest an FPC order authorizing a private power com-
pany to construct a generating plant on public lands. The Secretary had alleged
25. This result may have rested on the fact that Congress, in passing the Natural Gas
Act, required that the FPC consider the impact of its decisions on other sources of fuel
supply. H.R. Rep. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1941).
26. 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
27. Id. at 747. Accord, Juarez Gas Co., S.A. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 595, 597 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
28. See, e.g., California v. FPC, 353 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. of Am. v. FPC, 253 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1958); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 257 F.2d
717 (3d Cir. 1958), aff'd sub nom., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378
(1959).
29. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 705 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S.
707 (1943).
30. See, e.g., Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 287 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
31. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956), in which
consumers as well as competitors were granted standing because of indirect injury. See
supra notes 26, 27 and accompanying text.
32. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 527 (1965); Cahn, Law in the
Consumer Perspective, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1963); but see, Davis, "Judicial Control of
Administrative Action:" A Review, 66 Colum. L, Rev. 633, 667 (1966).
33. 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
34. The Court stated: "We hold that petitioners have standing. Differences of view,
however, preclude a single opinion of the Court .... Id. at 156.
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no personal injury but argued that his statutory duties85 constituted grounds
for standing.
The apparent ground upon which standing was granted in the Chapman
case has been made explicit in recent judicial decisions. In the past, if the
public interest was affected by an administrative decision, the courts would
grant standing to a privately injured party. Now, however, if no one is
privately injured by the alleged agency action, standing will be granted to a
party who demonstrates personal interest in the area affected by the adminis-
trative decision. Thus, a conservation group has been allowed to protest an
agency order affecting the use of virgin land.36 In that case the court stated:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately
protect the public interest in aesthetic, conservational and recrea-
tional aspects of power development, those who by their activities and
conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be held
to be aggrieved parties .... 37
Explicit standards to govern such grants of public interest standing have since
been formulated.38 The past record of the agency as the representative of the
public, the nature of the "public rights" to be vindicated, and the financial
ability of the petitioner to bear the cost of litigation have been suggested as
relevant criteria.3
9
Public interest standing has thus evolved to provide broad availability
of judicial review of administrative action. In this process, an unarticulated
principle seems to have functioned. The courts have apparently relied on the
conclusion that certain administrative actions will escape judicial review unless
interested persons who have not suffered personal injury are recognized as
35. The Secretary contended that it was his duty to act as marketing agent for publicly
produced coal and to promote conservation and efficient utilization of natural resources.
He alleged that because the FPC decision failed to take into account the latter considera-
tions he was "aggrieved" by administrative action.
A similar argument was explicitly accepted in Washington Dep't of Game v. FPC, 207
F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954). In that case, the Washington
State Departments of Game and Fisheries were permitted to challenge an FPC permit grant
which allowed two dams to be built on a navigable state river. The petitioners contended
that the questioned project would destroy fish which they were under a duty to protect.
36. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
37. 354 F.2d at 616. Petitioners were also said to have suffered some economic injury,
but the court did not regard this as a crucial factor. Id. See also, Lafayette Electronics
Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1965).
38. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1004-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
39. The court went on to say that agencies may formulate other reasonable rules to
determine who will represent the public interest before the Commission. In City of San
Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1967), an agency's rule for limiting the amount
of petitioning parties was upheld. The city which sought standing was held to be similarly
situated to several others of the sixty-five cities already in the proceeding. Its interests as
well as those of the public as a whole were already w11 represented. It seems, however, that
the "reasonableness" of an agency's discretionary rules may be successfully attacked. Cf.
Telephone Users Ass'n, Inc. v. FCC, 375 F.2d 923, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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aggrieved parties. Thus, judges have seen fit to lessen the standing requirements
in order to insure that the public interest will be considered in agency decisions.
III. TAXPAYER SUITS IN THE "PUBLIC INTEREST"
A. State and Municipal Taxpayer Standing
The early unrealistic approaches to public interest standing in the federal
administrative agency cases are similarly found in the judicial treatment of
state and municipal taxpayer suits. 40 Thus, many courts have insisted that a
potential representative of the public interest have alleged that he is a contribu-
tor to the public treasury.41 Although this requirement may be reasonable if the
litigant is seeking to question government spending, it has been demanded when
no apparent expenditure of funds is involved.42 Other courts have granted stand-
ing to obviate future increases in tax burdens when it appeared that the net
outcome of the suit would have no appreciable affect upon present or future
levels of taxation.
43
Perhaps the most popular judicial rationale for taxpayer standing is the
analogy to the shareholder derivative suit.44 A stockholder expends a certain
amount of money to purchase shares in a corporation. When the shareholder's
funds pass into the corporate treasury, a right to prevent illegality within the
corporation attaches. At this point, the directors of the corporation are liable
to the shareholder for subsequent wrongful actions.45 Analogously, it has been
argued that government officers are directors, and taxpayers are stockholders
in the state or municipal corporation. When an individual's tax payments enter
the government treasury, he has a right to enjoin subsequent illegal acts of the
government. 46 However, this analogy appears to fail when it is considered that
a shareholder's interest is based solely on voluntary stock ownership; in con-
trast, the taxpayer's interest arises compulsorily from residence within a juris-
diction.47 Furthermore, the functions of government affect many aspects of
every individual's existence, while corporate action touches only a shareholder's
pocketbook.
48
40. An excellent history of the taxpayer suit may be found in Comment, Taxpayer's
Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 Yale L.J. 895 (1960).
41. See, e.g., Coyle v. Housing Auth. of City of Danbury, 151 Conn. 421, 198 A.2d
709 (1964) ; Daly v. Madison County, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E.2d 160 (1941); Chircop v. City
of Pontiac, 363 Mich. 693, 110 N.W.2d 624 (1961); Loewen v. Shapiro, 389 Pa. 133, A.2d
525 (1957); Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818 (1951); Democrat Printing Co.
v. Simmerman, 245 Wis. 406, 14 N.W.2d 428 (1944).
42. See, e.g., Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401, 290 P.2d 237 (1955) (Tax-
payer may compel method of electing councilmen.); N.Y. Alco. Bev. Control Law § 123
(Taxpayer may enjoin illegal or unlicensed manufacture of wine, beer or liquor.).
43. See, e.g., Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915); Thompson v. City
of Dearborn, 347 Mich. 365, 79 N.W.2d 841 (1956).
44. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Village of Winnetka, 59 I1. 389 (1871); Shipley v. Smith,
45 N.M. 23, 107 P.2d 1050 (1940); Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. McIntyre, 100 Wis. 245,
75 N.W. 964 (1898).
45. 4 J. Dillion, Municipal Corporations § 1579 (5th ed. 1911).
46. Id. §§ 1580, 1581.
4Y. See Note, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1276, 1277 (1937).
48. See generally Comment, 2 Buffalo L. Rev. 140, 145-46 (1953).
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The questionable reasoning in the judicial treatment of taxpayer standing
may well be due to the historical context in which such suits arose. In the latter
part of the nineteenth century the political scandals, epitomized by the "Tweed
Ring," provided a catylyst for the taxpayer suit.49 A need was recognized for
some "between election" control of government expenditures. 50 The judiciary
fulfilled this need by allowing the state and local taxpayers to protest question-
able government spending. 51 Thus, as originally formulated, taxpayer standing
was based on social policy rather than a traditional concept of standing.
While the noteriety, if not the actuality, of misuse of government funds
has abated,5 2 judges who have recently faced the standing issue have still
allowed the taxpayer to sue.53 The most reasonable explanation for modern
taxpayer standing lies in judicial value judgments. Courts are balancing the
interests of the public in questionable government expenditures against the
lack of a traditional, personally injured plaintiff. 54 Apparently, the public
interest has become the predominating value and, lacking a more directly
affected plaintiff, judges have granted the taxpayer standing to represent the
citizenry. As one court has stated:
A holding that a citizen and taxpayer ... cannot question the right of
the city council to enter into such a vast undertaking [construction of
a city power plant with tax revenues] . . .would practically result in
a situation where no one would have a right to question the rights of
the council's illegal act in so doing.55
49. This historical background is stated in Ayers v. Lawrence, 59 N.Y. 192 (1874).
That case dealt with a statute which authorized municipal taxpayer suits. [1872] N.Y.
Sess. Laws ch. 161, now N.Y. Mun. Law § 51. Prior to the enactment of this statute,
local taxpayers had been denied standing. Adriance v. Mayor of N.Y., 1 Barb. 19 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1874). Furthermore, state prosecutors could not recover from third parties who wrong-
fully appropriated municipal funds. People v. Ingersoll, 58 N.Y. 1 (1874); People v. Fields,
58 N.Y. 491 (1874).
50. Arguably, the taxpayer suit rather allows minorities, ineffective at the ballot box,
to impede the functionings of elected representatives. But see infra notes 104, 105 and
accompanying text.
51. The taxpayer was originally granted standing to sue "in the public interest."
This fact is evident from the early cases which involved public debt financings, letting of
public contracts and granting of public franchises and licenses. See, e.g., Littler v. Jayne,
124 Ill. 123, 16 N.E. 374 (1888); Sanridge v. Village of Spring Lake, 112 Mich. 91, 70
N.W. 425 (1897); Lynn v. Polk, 76 Tenn. 121 (1881); Seymour v. City of Tacoma, 6
Wash. 138, 32 P. 1077 (1893).
52. Mass media tends to devote little space to local and state government affairs
which are not sensational. Therefore, clandestine corruption may continue on a small scale
without large exposure. See E. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 265-66 (1955). See generally
J. Boyd, Above the Law (1968).
53. See, Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass'n v. Timmons, 252 Iowa 163, 105 N.W.2d 209,
216 (1960) (dictum); Vibberts v. Hart, 85 R.I. 35, 125 A.2d 193 (1956); Miller v. City
of Pasco, 50 Wash. 2d 229, 310 P.2d 863 (1957).
54. See, Clapp v. Town of Jaffrey, 97 N.H. 456, 91 A.2d 464, 467 (1952); cf. Lien
v. Northwestern Eng'r Co., 74 S.D. 476, 54 N.W.2d 472 (1952).
55. Abbott v. Iowa City, 224 Iowa 698, 277 N.W. 437, 439 (1938). See also Reiter v.
Wallgreen, 28 Wash. 2d 872, 184 P.2d 571 (1947). In Reiter, the court held that a tax-
payer must initially petition the attorney general to challenge a questioned expenditure or
demonstrate that such a petition would be useless. The court went on to state: "We have
never held that, in a proper case where the attorney general refused to act to protect the
public interest, a taxpayer could not do so." Id. at 874, 184 P.2d at 573.
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In the minority of jurisdictions which normally deny standing to the state
taxpayer, the personal injury requirement has been the predominating value.
5 0
Only in a few deviant cases, when the suing taxpayer has raised an important
issue, have the courts overlooked the standing problem.67 Generally, the tax-
payer's injury is too insubstantial and indirect to constitute grounds for
standing.
58
B. Federal Taxpayer Standing
The right of the federal taxpayer to enjoin the execution of a federal
appropriation act was initially decided by the 1923 Supreme Court case of
Frothingham v. Mellon.5 9 In that case, the plaintiff sought to question the con-
stitutionality of the so-called "Maternity Act," 60 a Congressional statute grant-
ing federal funds for the purpose of reducing maternal and infant mortality in
the states. Petitioner alleged that since the illegal operation of the act would
increase her future tax burden, she was deprived of her property without due
process of law.61 This issue was not litigated, however, as the taxpayer was de-
nied standing. The court upheld its previous approval of local taxpayer stand-
ing based on the analogy to the shareholder derivative suit. 2 However, this
analogy was held to be inapplicable to the federal taxpayer who, unlike the
local taxpayer in relation to municipal expenditures, has a "comparatively
minute and indeterminable" interest in federal spending.0 3 Because of this token
interest, the federal taxpayer could not demonstrate a direct personal injury. The
court concluded that, lacking a personally aggrieved plaintiff, the "case or
controversy" requirement of the Constitution64 had not been fulfilled and the
suit must therefore be dismissed.6 5
The Frothingham holding, approved in numerous cases, 0 has been limited
on only two occasions. In one case,67 a statute which explicitly stated that cer-
56. Only two states, New York and New Mexico, appear to squarely prohibit tax-
payer's suits on the state level. Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641, 249 P. 1074 (1926);
Schiefflin v. Komfort, 212 N.Y. 520, 106 N.E. 675 (1914) (the mere payment of taxes in
common with the public affords no basis for attacking the constitutionality of state acts).
57. See, e.g., Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 641, 244 P.2d 520 (1952); Kuhn v. Curran,
294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E.2d 513 (1945); Cf., Anderson v. Rice, 277 N.Y. 271, 14 N.E.2d 65
(1938); Cash v. Bates 301 N.Y. 258, 93 N.E.2d 835 (1950).
58. See, e.g., Bull v. Stichman, 273 App. Div. 311, 78 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't 1948),
aff'd, 298 N.Y. 516, 80 N.E.2d 661, 300 N.Y. 460, 88 N.E.2d 325 (1949), where little weight
was given to previous New York decisions which had not carefully considered the standing
issue, see supra note 57 and the state taxpayer's suit was dismissed.
59. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
60. 42 Stat. 224, c. 135 (1921).
61. 262 U.S. at 486.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 487.
64. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
65. 262 U.S. at 489.
66. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (dictum); Doremus v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (dictum) ; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
(dictum); Williams v. Riley, 280 U.S. 78 (1929) (dictum); Laughlin v. Reynolds, 196 F.2d
863 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Elliot v. White, 23 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Wheless v. Mellon 10
F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Gart v. Cole, 166 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
67. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
894
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tain taxes imposed upon processors of farm products would be used to fund a
farm support program 8 was attacked. The plaintiff taxpayer was held to be
directly affected by this tax because he was also a farm products processor whose
specific tax dollar would be used in the questioned program. 9 In the second case,
federal expenditures were found to be inseparably interwoven with allegedly
illegal local action. 70 The court reasoned that because the federal taxpayer was
directly and personally injured by the local occurrences, he could challenge that
action and the legality of the federal expenditures.
71
In the limiting situations above, the taxpayer was able to show a personal
injury apart from his normal payment of taxes and thus fulfill the "case or
controversy" requirement of the Frothingham case. However, if the petitioner
wishes to rely only on his status as a taxpayer to obtain standing, he must
show a "direct dollars-and-cents injury."1 2 Apparently, this requirement may
be fulfilled by contributing a large enough quantity of money to the relevant
treasury. Thus, in Everson v. Board of Educ.,73 a local taxpayer was found to'
have had a substantial enough interest in his city's spending to be personally
injured by a questioned local expenditure. Despite the fact that a local rather
than federal taxpayer was involved, the rationale of Frothingham was applicable
since the Supreme Court's "case or controversy" requirement had to be met to
obtain standing. The Court allowed the petitioner to protest his municipality's
program for reimbursement of bus fares to parochial school children because
his economic interests were directly affected by the spending of the local school
board.74
Academicians have criticized the use of quantitative financial injury as a
basis for allowing the local taxpayer a right to sue and denying standing to
the federal taxpayer. 75 Professor Davis has reasoned that the large corpora-
tion's contribution to the federal treasury is proportionately greater than the
the local taxpayer's contribution to the municipal treasury. 76 Since the corpora-
tion's economic interest in federal expenditures may thus be as directly affected
as the local taxpayer's economic interests in municipal expenditures, the cor-
poration should have standing to challenge Congressional spending. 77
68. Agricultural Adjustment Act, c. 25, 48 Stat. 31, § 9 (1933).
69. But see Cain v. United States, 211 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1954) where the court
apparently rejected the "specifically earmarked" distinction holding it to be no extension of
the power of Congress. Note, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 29 (1954).
70. Franklin Township v. Tugwell, 85 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
71. For a different conception of this case, see Note, So Harv. L. Rev. 1276, 1280
(1937).
72. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
73. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
74. Although the Supreme Court failed to expressly deal with the standing question
in Everson, its position on that case was expressed in Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. at 434.
75. See 3 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 22.09, at 244 (1958); L. Jaffe,
supra note 32, at 484.
76. 3 K.C. Davis, supra note 75.
77. Professor Davis theorizes that General Motors, which pays in the vicinity of a
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Notwithstanding this demonstrated anomaly, the courts have refused to
recognize the economic injury of the federal taxpayer as the requisite personal
injury which has traditionally been needed to bring suit.78 However, the purpose
of requiring a showing of personal injury is to assure a concrete adverseness; 7
when the litigant has been able to demonstrate such adverseness without per-
sonal injury, the Court has granted standing. For example, in Baker v. Carr8o
the appellants were voters who sought to determine the constitutionality of the
voting district apportionment of certain counties in Tennessee. The litigants
did not plead a direct personal injury, apparently because their votes were in
fact being counted toward election of a Congressional representative. They could
show only a "disadvantage to themselves as individuals"81 because their votes
were not being given the same weight as others. Nevertheless, the Court con-
concluded that the appellants had demonstrated a "personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy" 8 2 which assured that adverse parties were involved
in litigation. The Court went on to note that these litigants were suing on their
own behalf and on behalf of "those similarly situated."8 3 Thus, having found
the requisite "adverseness," the Court accepted what was, in effect, a suit on
behalf of the public interest.
In the treatment of public interest suits in the federal agency area, per-
sonal injury was explicitly rejected as a sine qua non for standing. Circuit
Judge Frank, in Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes,8 4 found that the required
"controversy" existed when a government officer's action was attacked as a
violation of his statutory powers.85 Therefore, Congress could constitutionally
authorize an individual who has suffered no personal injury to challenge the
action of a federal agency.88 Similarly, in the taxpayer cases, it could be
reasoned that a "controversy" exists when a government expenditure is attacked
as a violation of the Constitution.87 In this manner, a court could allow an
individual to challenge the constitutionality of the expenditure.
Since there is no constitutional requirement of personal injury, the Froth-
ingham principle appears to be a rule of policy rather than a rule of law.8 8 The
policies operative in the federal agency cases have caused the Court to abandon
billion dollars in taxes yearly, makes a two per cent pro rata contribution to each federal
expenditure. Id.
78. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
79. Cf. School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1962); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
80. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
81. Id. at 206.
82. Id. at 204.
83. Id. at 207.
84. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
85. 134 F.2d at 704.
86. Id.
87. L. Jaffe, supra note 32, at 498.
88. See 3 K.C. Davis, supra note 75, at 243; L. Jaffe, supra note 32; S. Rep. No. 85,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 492-501 (1966) (statements
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personal injury as a requirement for standing in that area.89 The final considera-
tion therefore is whether the policies operative in the taxpayer cases require the
use of personal injury as a basis for standing.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY
By allowing a litigant who has suffered no personal injury to challenge
federal agency action, the courts have substantially broadened the possibility
of judicial review of administrative decisions. As a result, the affected agency
is required to expend more energy and attention in litigating appeals. Further-
more, by thus allowing the courts to pass on administrative policy changes
more regularly, a commission's capacity to plan for new events is inhibited 0
Thus, flexibility in the administrative agencies is sacrificed. However, the courts
will grant standing only when the latter considerations are outweighed by the
public importance of the issue raised by the petitioner.91 Similarly, in the state
and local taxpayer cases, the courts have often granted standing only if the
issue raised was significant, 92 and only if the case was proper for judicial inter-
vention.9 3 Concededly, there are areas of the law where no one has standing
because the subject is one entrusted to the final authority of government
branches other than the judiciary.9 4
Notwithstanding the fact that the above limitations could be operative in
federal taxpayer standing, some judges have suggested that such a right to sue
would result in a proliferation of litigation and inundation of the federal courts.95
However, financial deterrents to potential litigants, 6 the use of class actions,97
and the power to stay or consolidate redundant actions98 mitigate the force of
of Profs. Davis, Griswold & Freund); 111 Cong. Rec. 6131-32 (1965) (remarks of Rep.
E. Cellar).
89. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) ; Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ
v, FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
90. Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Government Planning: Judicial Review and
Policy Formulation, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 329, 339 (1966). See M. Bernstein, Regulating
Business by Independent Commission 93-96 (1955); Friendly, The Federal Administrative
Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1962).
But see Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 Yale LJ. 1227, 1248-55 (1966).
91. See, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965).
92. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E.2d 513 (1945); see also Miller v.
Cooper, 56 N.M. 641, 244 P.2d 520 (1952).
93. See supra note 54 and cases cited therein.
94. These areas of "non-justiciability" are normally termed "political questions" by
the courts. However, whether an issue is "political" is itself a question of law for which
nebulous standards apparently exist. See Frank, Political Questions, in Supreme Court and
Supreme Law 36-43 (E. Cahn, ed. 1954); see also infra notes 116, 117 and accompanying
text.
95. Trepidation was originally expressed in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,
487 (1923): "If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other
taxpayer may do the same ... in respect of every other appropriation act and statute... !
96. For a determination of permanent and possible cost in federal court, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 30(g)(1), (2), 30(d), 37(a), (c), 41(d), 42(a), 45(b), (c), 53(d), 55(b)(1),
56(g), 58, 65(c), 68, 73(c), (d), (e), (f), 75(e), (i), 4(c).
97. Id. 23.
98. Id. 62(h), 42(a) respectively.
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this contention. Furthermore, the fact that many people may sue upon a right
has never been held to present an obstacle to suit. 9
Some commentators have attempted to minimize the need for federal tax-
payer standing as opposed to state and local taxpayer standing. 00 These writers
suggest that federal spending, because it is of national significance, is sus-
ceptable to pressures of public exposure and criticism. 0 1 On the other hand,
state and local expenditures are likely to be unpublicized and quickly forgot-
ten. 10 2 Therefore, the state and local taxpayer must have standing to insure the
proper channeling of his government's spending. However, this argument lacks
validity in terms of a Congressman's constituency. If a proposed expenditure of
questionable Constitutionality appeals to the majority of his voters, the respec-
tive Congressman is likely to support it.
0 3
The most persuasive arguments against taxpayer standing involve per-
sonal motives and legislative flexibility. The litigating taxpayer, rather than
seeking to uphold the "public interest," may be interested only in personal pub-
licity, partisan political objectives, or delay of unwanted projects. 04 On any
spectrum of values, these motives would not be adequate reasons for impeding
the legislative process. 0 5 A further consideration is that the bulk of federal
expenditures involves defense and foreign affairs. 10 Review of such spending
may be particularly inappropriate because of a lack of judicial familiarity in
these areas 0 7 and substantial problems of obtaining necessary documentation
and information. 08
99. Cf. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
100. See, H.M. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 166
(1953); Comment, 18 Ill. L. Rev. 204 (1924).
101. For an analysis of the extensive press coverage in Washington, D.C., sec D. Cater,
The Fourth Branch of Government (1959).
102. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
103. In 1961, the late President Kennedy stated that proposed legislation to aid paro-
chial schools raised a "serious constitutional question." N.Y. Times, March 9, 1961, at 16,
col. 3. In 1965, Congress authorized the use of federal funds to finance guidance services
and instruction in basic academic subjects in religiously operated schools. Funds were further
appropriated for the purchase of textbooks and other instructional materials for use in such
schools. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, tits. I, 1, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-le,
821-27 (Supp. 1. 1965).
104. Professor Davis submits that such "crackpots and officious interneddlers" have
not and would not overrun the courts. 3 K.C. Davis, supra note 75, at 254.
105. The Supreme Court appears to regard personal motivation as irrelevant. "[I]t
would not matter that their dominant inducement to action was more religious than mer-
cenary." Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 at 434 (1952). But see Pauling v.
McNamara, 331 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 933 (1964). The court
significantly mentioned its feeling that the petitioner, Linus Pauling, was merely seeking
personal publicity and denied him standing. 331 F.2d at 798.
106. For the fiscal year 1967, receipts totaled $115,794,051,984. Funds appropriated to
the President for "Military" expenses were $849,959,911 and for "Denfense Department"
expenses $68,913,073,246. The World Almanac 858 (1968). Foreign Aid expenditures for
fiscal 1966 amounted to $4,535,000,000. Id. at 556.
107. Cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1935); Republic of China v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1956).
108. On the other hand, the sovereign immunity defense would not seem to be a bar.
The taxpayer suit normally names certain public officials in charge of the relevant expendi-
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Thus, a "blanket" right to challenge federal expenditures would be neither
practical nor advisable. One writer has suggested that when the litigation in-
volves a "clear-cut" issue in which everyone has a legitimate interest, the court
should grant the taxpayer standing to sue.' 0 9 This method would require the
petitioner to convince the court that a so-called "public-right" is-involved and
that it is generally in the public interest to uphold that right." 0 However, under
the weight of criticism based on the need for quick effectuation of federal spend-
ing programs,"" the proposal has apparently been abandoned."
2
V. CONCLUSION
The apparent solution to granting taxpayer standing on the federal level
lies in a controlled use of judicial discretion. Specific rules for determining and
limiting the type of federal spending which may be challenged should be formu-
lated. In addition, definite standards for ascertaining whether a particular
taxpayer is best qualified to represent the public interest in questionable govern-
ment expenditures should be developed.
Pursuant to the necessities suggested above, it is first submitted that federal
taxpayer standing be confined to cases which involve a justiciable Constitutional
abridgment of public rights. This suggestion finds support in the facts of the
recent case of Flast v. Gardner.113 In that case, federal taxpayers sued to en-
join federal expenditures in aid of parochial schools." 4 The public's right to
be free from government violations of the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause" 5 was thereby put in issue. This fact makes the case justiciable and pro-
vides basis for granting standing to a representative of the public interest.
In addition to allowing the public access to the courts in a proper situa-
tion, the above suggestion mitigates one of the major policy considerations
against taxpayer standing. It may be argued that expenditures for defense and
foreign affairs should not be reviewed because they may be based on secret
government information and documentation. Since the rule herein suggested
would not require a judicial inquiry into the government's reasons for passing
particular legislation, disclosure of such evidence would not be required. The
tures as defendants. The fact that the suit is against the officials rather than the government
itself has been held sufficient to defeat the defense. See, e.g., White Eagle Oil & Refining
Co. v. Gunderson, 48 S.D. 608, 205 N.W. 614 (1925).
109. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
255, 304 (1961).
110. L. Jaffe, supra note 32, at 490.
111. See Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodesl'-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963
Sup. Ct. Rev. 15, 16.
112. L. Jaffe, supra note 32, at 497.
113. 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 895 (1967). The
district court denied standing, interpreting Frothingham to mean that the federal taxpayer
has no right to sue in that capacity.
114. The legislation which was challenged was the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965, tits. I, II, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-le, 821-27 (Supp. I, 1965).
115. U.S. Const., amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion .....
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actual effect of the statute by which the questioned expenditures were autho-
rized would be the only consideration before the court.
The suggested rule would also preclude judicial entrance into the realm
of non-justiciable "political questions." Such questions are not justiciable be-
cause they require the courts to review legislative or executive policy which has
caused individual injury. For example, in Pauling v. McNamara,"16 petitioners
were denied standing to enjoin the Secretary of Defense and members of the
Atomic Energy Commission from detonating radiation-producing nuclear
weapons. Although a personal injury to the appellants from radiation contamina-
tion could be shown, the court held that the questioned activities must be left
to the final authority of the executive and legislative branches of the govern-
ment.117 Thus, absent the abridgment of a constitutional right, the court re-
fused to pass on the policy involved in the testing of nuclear weapons. Accord-
ingly, the policy involved in a questioned federal expenditure should not be
challenged unless a constitutional right of the public is abridged.
Having determined that a justiciable public right is in issue, the court
should further decide whether the litigant who is seeking standing is the best
representative of the public interest. To this end, the traditional desire for
"adverseness" should not be abandoned. Adverseness is best achieved when
standing is granted to a person who has the greatest "personal stake""18 in the
outcome of the litigation. This principle is illustrated by the factual situation
in Doremus v. Board of Educ.119 In that case, a state's requirement that the
Bible be read in public schools was challenged. A state taxpayer, suing in that
capacity alone, could not show as great a personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation as could a child or parent of a child in the public school system.120
A student in the schools has a greater personal stake because, in having to
participate in the questioned activity, he is personally injured. In contrast, in
the previously discussed Flast case, since no one is personally injured by the
questioned government expenditures, the taxpayer has the greatest personal
interest in the outcome of the suit. His concern for the constitutional use of his
and other members of the public's tax dollar assures "adverseness" in the
litigation.
Adverseness may be further guaranteed by alluding to the recent develop-
ments in the federal administrative agency area. For example, in the Scenic
Hudson'2' case, a conservation group was granted standing to represent the
public interest in "aesthetic, conservational and recreational" aspects of power
116. 331 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 933 (1964).
117. 331 F.2d at 801.
118. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
119. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
120. A petitioning parent was denied standing because her child had graduated before
the case reached the Supreme Court. Since she no longer had a "personal stake" In the out-
come of the controversy, adverseness was lacking.
121. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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development because of their "special" interest in these areas. 122 Similarly, the
federal taxpayer may be required to show a special interest in the issue placed
before the court. This may necessitate good faith membership with an organiza-
tion which has shown concern in the area of dispute. Besides further guarantee-
ing the taxpayer's "adverseness," such a showing would assure the public of a
concerned and qualified representative and act as a deterrent to the frivolous
suit.
The suggested requirements for federal taxpayer standing discussed above
will to a large extent prevent the suit brought for personal rather than public
motives. To further buttress this purpose, it may be advisable to adopt a finan-
cial deterrent. Specifically, a litigant may be required to post a bond sufficient
to cover assessable costs and fees, unless a court is shown that the litigant is
financially unable to do so.' 23 Since a plaintiff's willingness to bear the cost
of litigation manifests confidence in the soundness of his legal argument, this
requirement will further assure adequate representation of the public interest.
A view of the history of Supreme Court decisions reveals that speedy and
efficient handling 6f the docket was effectuated only by strict adherence to
judicially developed standing rules. However, the pressing importance of a right
to sue for the federal taxpayer may induce its legislative enactment. 2 4 Such
legislation may be drafted with limitations as to the type of Congressional
spending which may attacked. However, the statute may not limit or define the
type of federal taxpayer who can sue. Thus, adequate representation of the pub-
lic interest will not be assured and excessive and extraneous litigation may be
protracted in the federal courts. Since the law of standing is inextricably in-
volved in the "Justice delayed is justice denied" maxim of the judiciary, it is
submitted that rules should be developed by the judiciary within the guidelines
suggested above.
C EiAR s A. ZiELiNsKi
122. 354 F.2d at 616.
123. Six states which allow the taxpayer suit require such petitioner, in some circum-
stances, to perform this duty. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 11-642, 35-213 (1956); Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 84-1613 (1949); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 5266 (1954); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 102
§§ 14, 16 (1957); N.Y. Mun. Law § 51; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 309.12-.13, 733.59 (1954).
124. The Senate has passed a bill that will allow a taxpayer to challenge federal
expenditures which allegedly violate the First Amendment. S. 3 90th Cong., 1st Sess.; S.
Rep. No. 85, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1967).
